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COMPETING PROPOSALS FOR THE TAX
TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
The wide variety and still changing tax treatment of capital gains and
losses in other countries and the repeated shifts in the American
treatment clearly demonstrate that a single policy has not been uni-
versally accepted. Our analysis has brought out the major reasons.
The proper treatment remains a problem everywhere because it pre-
sents various unresolved conificts —inand between concepts of
income, equitable considerations, revenue yield, administrative re-
quirements, the desire to avoid harmful effects upon the markets for
capital assets and upon investment incentives, and other objectives
of tax policy.
In sharp contrast to British practice, the United States taxed capi-
tal gains in full as ordinary income at the beginning of its present
series of income tax laws (under the 16th Amendment to the Con-
stitution). After 9 years of such taxation and 4 of allowing capital
losses in full, Congress responded to strong complaints that this treat-
ment was seriously impeding the sale of assets on which individuals
would realize gains and unduly stimulating the sale of those on which
they could realize losses. Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1921
(applicable to 1922), a series of compromise measures was enacted.
In each, capital gains continued to be classified as income, but the
application of the rate schedule, the allowance for capital losses, the
definition of capital assets, and other provisions were successively
modified in different ways in an endeavor more adequately to satisfy
one or more competing objectives. Since each new set of provisions
was an ad hoc compromise, differences of opinion persisted. Current
proposals for modification run the gamut from complete nonrecogni-
tion for income tax purposes to full inclusion of unrealized as well
as realized changes in market values.
We may best preface a survey of the chief proposals by restating
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in summary fashion the major considerations, discussed at length in
preceding chapters, for and against excluding capital gains and
losses from taxable income or treating them differently.
1 GENERAL CASE FOR EXCLUDING CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES FROM
TAXABLE INCOME OR TREATING THEM DIFFERENTLY
With the impressive support of prevailing practice in the United
Kingdom and its dominions, complete exclusion has been urged
upon Congress at various times since the adoption of the 16th
Amendment. Essentially the same arguments have been offered from
time to time for separating capital gains and losses from other taxable
income and subjecting the net gains to a small flat rate, such as 5or
10 percent, while disallowing net losses entirely, or for otherwise
severely limiting the application of the income tax to capital gains
and losses. The main reasons advanced for these positions are:
1) Capital gains and losses are not valid elements of true income as
that term is widely used. The traditional concept of income includes
only more or less regular and recurring or in any event, more or less
expected receipts. An occasional sporadic gain or loss, especially if
unexpected and unsought, does not function like income in guiding
conduct or in determining the allocation of economic resources. For
this reason many economists, for their general analytical purposes,
though not specifically for those of taxation, confine the concept of
income to more or less expected or recurring receipts. Similarly, the
accountant usually separates capital gains and losses, if substantial,
from ordinary income.
2) It is urged that when appreciation in the value of a capital asset
is treated as income, it is really capital that is being taxed, for the
appreciation usually represents merely an increase in the present
value of expected future incomes to be derived from the asset, not
an addition to current disposable income. In many instances, capi-
tal gains represent merely changes in the values of titles to some
of the wealth of the country, not additions to it. Such gains do not
constitute disposable income for the country as a whole. Even when
capital gains represent real additions to the country's wealth, as
when mines or oil resources are discovered, they are not currently
disposable income for society as a whole.
To tax them as income, then, puts a double tax on the recipient —
firston the capital value of future incomes, then on the incomes them-
selves as they are received. A man who reinvests a capital gain of
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gain. To tax him also on the principal value of the gain itself is to
tax him twice. Similarly, there is a double allowance for capital
losses when taxable income is reduced by both the capital value of
the loss and the subsequent decline in annual income.
3) The exclusion of capital gains and losses from taxable income
avoids the unjust and otherwise harmful effects of taxing as income
the spurious capital gains that merely reflect a rise in the general
price level —adepreciation in the value of the monetary unit. Many
home-owners experienced this type of illusory gain during and after
World War II, when all the money profit they realized by selling a
house in one city or neighborhood was commonly needed to help pay
for a similar house elsewhere. It likewise avoids inappropriate allow-
ances for the illusory capital losses that merely reflect a decline in
the general price level or a rise in the purchasing power of money.
4) Similarly, capital gains and losses due to changes in interest rates,
when realized incidentally to a shift of investments, may leave the
investor's actual income unchanged. For example, the income from
an investor's securities will remain $4,500 a year if he sells, at a
$20,000 profit, $100,000 par value of 16 year 4½ percent bonds he
purchased at par and reinvests the entire proceeds in approximately
$120,000 of 3¾ percent similar bonds at par. When interest rates
rise, the resulting fall in the market value of his securities, whether
or not realized by sale, will similarly leave his interest income un-
changed, because their smaller capital value, invested at the higher
rates, will produce the same income as before.
5)Underthe graduated rate schedule of the income tax, the impo-
sition of the standard rates upon capital gains realized in a single
year but emerging over a longer period is inequitable because it usu-
ally subjects the gain to a higher effective tax rate than would be
applicable if the gain had been allocated among the years during
which it arose. In the same way long emerging capital losses, if con-
centrated in the year of realization, have less tax-reducing value.
6) Overshadowing the foregoing economic and equitable considera-
tions has been the emphasis, in statements before Congressional com-
mittees and elsewhere, upon various undesirable practical conse-
quences said to flow from treating capital gains and losses as ordinary
components of taxable income. A taxpayer usually cannot avoid
taxes on ordinary income except by foregoing the income itself. But
he can avoid the tax on a possible capital gain by refraining from
realizing it, yet enjoy many of the advantages of the gain in the form284 CHAPTER 11
of an increase in his wealth and in the increased earning power, divi-
dends, interest, or rent the unrealized gain commonly reflects. Since
the investor commonly possesses a wide and often unlimited range
of choice whether and when to realize his gains in a legal sense, any
substantial tax acts as a deterrent to selling property yielding capital
gains. The effect is to impose a heavy tax on transfers of such capital
assets. In consequence, it is argued that society does not get the
benefit of highly fluid markets for capital assets, and of their easy
and continuous redistribution among those most anxious to own and
use them. Individuals are deterred from making otherwise desirable
shifts in the composition of their assets as their needs change. A
conspicuous contention is that price movements in both directions
are exaggerated in the markets for common stocks and other equities
by the reluctance of owners to sell when prices are rising in the face
of an avoidable tax on their gains, and their added disposition to sell
when prices are declining in order to benefit from a deductible capital
loss. The accentuated fluctuations reduce the attractiveness of equity
investments. Further, since venturesome investment depends in con-
siderable degree upon the prospect of exceptional returns, which are
often possible only in the form of capital gains, heavy taxes on the
latter may discourage the assumption of unusual risks.
Another point made is that the net revenues from any substantial
taxation of capital gains and reasonably related allowances for capi-
tal losses are negligible over a long period because of the tendency
for gains and losses to cancel and because the realization of losses is
encouraged while that of gains is discouraged. In this event, exclud-
ing capital gains and losses would improve the stability of the yield
from the personal income tax without seriously reducing its average
amount. Under existing treatment, the freedom of taxpayers to
choose whether and when to realize gains and losses enables them to
time their transactions so as to minimize their tax liabilities. Well
advised taxpayers are fairly certain to avail themselves of the tax
benefits from realizing their losses when they have offsetting income,
and to minimize taxes on their gains by realizing them mainly when
they have offsetting losses or by not taking them at all, leaving them
to pass untaxed (as far as the income, but not the estate, tax is con-
cemed) to their heirs. A low flat rate on capital gains without allow-
ance for capital losses has been urged as a means of increasing rev-
enues by encouraging larger transfers of assets embodying capital
gains. Finally, it is argued that estate and gift taxes provide rough
offsets to the avoidance of income taxes on capital gains.COMPETING PROPOSALS 285
2 GENERAL CASE AGAINST EXCLUDING CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
OR TREATING THEM DIFFERENTLY
The main opposing arguments are:
1) Although different concepts of income may well be valid for other
purposes, the proper measure of income for tax purposes is to be
found in the actual ex post results of economic activity, not in sub-
jective expectations or presumptions. Taxable income, it is urged,
should measure the relative capacity of individuals to pay taxes, as
indicated by the net annual additions to their wealth from economic
activity plus their consumption. Capital gains supply an individual
with the same additions as any other kind of personal income to his
power to buy consumption goods or investments, and to provide for
his family's future. To exclude profits of this kind from income tax
or to grant them markedly preferential treatment seriously confficts
with the purposes of a graduated income tax. Capital gains constitute
a major source of income for many individuals. Both the average
capital gain per taxpayer and the proportion of taxpayers who report
capital gains rise sharply from lower to higher incomes. In some years
capital gains have exceeded dividends as a source of income for tax-
payers reporting incomes above $100,000. And the unequal distribu-
tion of capital gains among taxpayers in each income group accen-
tuates the inequity of excluding them from income tax or of giving
them unduly preferential rates.
In economic character capital gains differ only in varying degree
from other forms of personal income. They are often deliberately
sought as a species of profits. They are rarely wholly 'unexpected'
but, like ordinary business profits, represent varying mixtures of
expected and unexpected elements. In fact, if capital gains did not so
commonly constitute a sought reward for exertion and risk, it could
be contended that they should be taxed more heavily than ordinary
income because they would then not serve any function in spurring
initiative and exertion or in allocating economic resources. In prac-
tice, capital gains embody large elements of personal compensation,
interest, profits, and rents, and often constitute a thinly veiled dis-
guise for these ordinary kinds of income. A conspicuous example
occurs when the retention of earnings by a corporation over a period
of years causes its stock to rise, enabling its stockholders to obtain
a varying proportion of these reinvested earnings in the form of a
capital gain by seffing the shares, and even to avoid a personal income
tax on these earnings by leaving their stock to their heirs.
The difficulty of distinguishing clearly, on economic grounds, be-286 CHAPTER 11
tween capital gains and other income creates serious administrative
difficulties when the gains receive preferential tax treatment, and
stimulates efforts on the part of taxpayers and their lawyers to con-
vert ordinary income into this form. It is contended by some that the
tax preference and the associated tax avoidance adversely affect the
morale of the general body of taxpayers, whose cooperation is essen-
tial for the American system of a self-assessed income tax.
The sporadic and lumpy character of capital gains and losses is
true also in varying degree of other kinds of income, notably business
profits. Moreover, higher rather than lower taxes on long emerging
capital gains can be justified as an interest charge: the taxpayer has
enjoyed the free use of funds otherwise payable in taxes during the
period he has postponed realizing his gain. The logical method of
achieving equitable tax treatment of fluctuating incomes under a
graduated rate schedule is to adopt some system of averaging, not
exclude them.
2) The allegation that taxation is double when both a capital gain
and its subsequent annual yield are taxed, and the related contention
that this practice reduces the country's stock of capital, are not rele-
vant, it is argued, for a personal income tax. Individuals are free to
consume or to reinvest their realized capital gains. They are in the
same position as those who have accumulated savings from other
current income. The latter are subject to tax on the saved portion of
their income and will pay taxes also on the yield subsequently derived
from investing these savings. In both cases the income inclusive of
current savings and capital gains measures the addition to the tax-
payer's power to command and direct economic resources into chan-
nels of his own choosing. Income taxes are designed, among other
purposes, to divert a fraction of this total power to the government.
Were taxable income confined to consumed income, a sizeable pro-
portion of total personal income would be exempt. Conceivably, this
exclusion might be desirable under some circumstances, but the case
for it would not apply peculiarly to capital gains.
All taxes impinge in some degree upon the capacity of taxpayers
to save and to accumulate capital. One purpose of the income tax, as
of estate and gift taxes, is to reduce inequalities in the distribution of
income and wealth, even if this entails some reduction in private
capital or in current additions to it. Whether the aggregate capital of
the country is lessened by the same amounts depends upon what the
government does with the tax proceeds; public roads, school build-
ings, and the like are also capital goods.COMPETING PROPOSALS 287
3) To the extent that capital gains and losses are offset by an opposite
change in the purchasing power of money, they are doubtless ficti-
tious in the sense that they do not measure a change in the economic
status of the recipient. In the event of a rapid and substantial rise in
the price level, such as occurred in various European countries dur-
ing and after the two World Wars, special measures may well be
warranted to exclude the illusory capital gains from income taxes.
These could take the form, in inflation, of raising the cost basis of
capital assets by stipulated percentages, as has been done recently
in France and Belgium. Existing provisions protect holders of busi-
ness assets in part by permitting them to postpone recognition of
capital gains realized when the proceeds are invested in similar
property; and a similar rule could be adopted for houses or even for
all nonbusiness assets. If prices fell drastically, parallel treatment
would call for deflating capital values by the use of indexes or to
impose restrictions on the deductibility of capital losses.
Serious administrative and other difficulties would be involved in
isolating and providing special treatment for capital gains and losses
that reflect changes only in the general price level. Hence it is recog-
nized that such a procedure, if adopted at all, is likely to be confined
in practice to periods in which the price level fluctuates violently
within a relatively short time. But a gradual price movement, if pro-
longed, may become sizeable in the aggregate, giving rise to substan-
tial fictitious capital gains and losses. Some would ignore these effects
of moderate or gradual changes in price levels. Others would not
make any special provision for any illusory capital gains and losses
on the ground that the only proper avenue of attack upon unstable
price levels is through the broad instruments of monetary and fiscal
policy. Still others would treat this problem by according a preferen-
tial tax treatment to all capital gains and imposing restrictions on the
deductibility of all capital losses —thegeneral manner in which long
term capital gains and losses have been treated in the United States
since 1921.
4) Capital gains and losses caused solely by changes in interest rates
are not really ifiusory. An investor who realizes a $20,000 profit by
selling his bonds after interest rates have fallen can command
$20,000 more of the world's real goods. Relative to other individuals,
he has gained in net worth, even though his interest income 'may
remain the same.
5)Itis argued that the alleged adverse effects upon the capital mar-
kets of including capital gains and losses in taxable income are greatly288 CHAPTER 11
exaggerated. Empirical evidence indicates that realized gains and
losses have fluctuated mainly with stock prices rather than with
changes in tax treatment. Much of the actual impediment to transfers
of capital assets said to be created by substantial taxes on capital
gains is really due to the possibility of avoiding such taxes completely
by holding appreciated assets until death and by using them as gifts
without incurring tax liability (the donee will incur such liability if
he sells). The proper attack upon these impediments, it is urged, is
to remove all possibility of avoiding the tax by making every transfer
of property, during life or at death, an occasion for recognizing a
capital gain or loss, and, possibly, by periodically recognizing ac-
crued but unrealized gains and losses. Because gift and estate taxes
are payable also by individuals who do not enjoy capital gains and
by those who have paid income taxes on realized gains, they do not
offset the inequity of taxing capital gains at lower rates or exempting
them..
The point is 'made that the problem of inducing enough venture-
some investment cannot be met equitably or adequately by the pref-
erential tax treatment of capital gains, because the greater part of
the rewards of risk-taking are often, perhaps usually, obtained from
ordinary business profits, dividends, and rents. As far as we design
the tax system to foster this type of investment, we should do so
broadly, covering all the rewards for exceptional effort and risk,
rather than a single and often spurious form of such rewards.
6) Even though capital gains and losses may conceivably cancel out
in the long run for taxpayers as a whole, they do not do so for indi-
viduals. Just as we do not allow the aggregate net losses of deficit
corporations and individuals to offset the taxable income of others,
the net capital losses of some taxpayers do not, it is contended, jus-
tify complete tax exemption or preferential rates for the capital
gains of others. Our taxation of capital gains, despite preferential
rates, has actually yielded substantial revenues, only a portion of
which can be attributed to the restricted deductibility of net capital
losses. The irregularity of the revenues is not a solid reason for relin-
quishing them. Business profits too are notoriously unstable as a
source of tax revenue. Reduction of the public debt is an excellent
use for the surplus revenues of good years, and a revenue source
that automatically yields less in bad years has the virtue of reducing
the adverse effects of federal tax collectiOns upon private spending
in depressions.COMPETING PROPOSALS 289
The conflict of considerations barely summarized above and elabo-
rated in preceding chapters is the 'problem' of capital gains and
losses: to devise a tax treatment that will most nearly satisfy the
demands of equity —ofgiving equal treatment to similarly circum-
stanced individuals —andat the same time avoid unduly impeding
useful transfers of capital assets. The major proposals for meeting
this problem fall into two broad groups. One group seeks the full
inclusion of capital gains and losses in taxable income while mini-
mizing the undesirable effects by averaging them or by averaging
total income over a number of years, or by including unrealized as
well as realized changes in market values of capital assets. The other
group would compromise the conificts of equitable and practical
considerations by various ad hoc measures of the same general char-
acter as those employed in the United States since 1922, but with
more or less recognition of capital gains and losses as components
of taxable income. Common to both groups is the question whether
and to what extent unrealized appreciation and depreciation should
be recognized, particularly upon transfers of property by gift or at
death.
We begin with the more extreme proposals because they best
clarify the major issues.
3 FULL ANNUAL RECOGNITION OF BOTH ACCRUED AND REALIZED
GAINS AND LOSSES
One line of attack proposed by some students to minimize the inequi-
ties and undesired practical effects of full recognition of sporadic
capital gains and losses as realized, while treating changes in capital
values as elements of taxable income, is to include all such changes,
whether or not realized by sale, in the income base.' Each taxpayer
would report on his income tax return the value of all his assets at the
beginning of the year, plus the cost of those acquired during the year
(legacies and gifts being entered at their value when received), and
their value at the end of the year. A net increase, including capital
gains realized during the year, would be added to his ordinary in-
come, and a net decrease, including realized capital losses, would be
deducted. All special provisions for capital gains and losses, such as
1SeeNational Tax Association, Proceedings, Ninth Annual Conference
(1915), p. 303, which presents a report of a committee of the Association;
Committee on Taxation of the Twentieth Century Fund, Facing the Tax
Problem (1937), p. 490; and Capital Gains Taxation, pp. 26.8, 95, which
presents a panel discussion.290 CHAPTER 11
preferential rates, percentage exclusion, holding periods, maximum
alternative rates, and loss limitations would be eliminated.
The advantages claimed for this proposal are:
1) It would achieve a higher degree of uniformity of tax treatment of
personal incomes than appears to be possible under any alternative
proposal. Individuals who added to their wealth by capital gains
would be taxed as fully as those whose additions came from other
kinds of income. Deferring the realization of gains until death would
no longer permit avoidance of the income tax on them, and postpon-
ing them would no longer give the holder the free use of tax money.
2) It would supply a means of subjecting stockholders to personal
income tax on their pro rata shares of reinvested corporate profits,
to the extent that the latter actually added to the market values of
the shares. In this degree individuals whose saved income takes the
form of corporate earnings reinvested in their behalf would be taxed
at the same rates as those whose current savings are invested in other
ways. The taxation of only realized capital gains, in contrast, allows
largeamounts of earnings accumulated through corporations to
escape personal income taxes entirely by transfer of the stocks at
death, and permits even the realized accumulations to be taxed at
preferential rates under existing law.
3) Full recognition of unrealized gains would eliminate the present
tax impediments to transfers of property. No additional tax liability
would be incurred upon the sale of an appreciated investment, for
the tax on the increase in value would be payable even if the asset
was not sold. Indeed, the latter tax liability would serve as a spur to
the taxpayer to sell any property he did not positively desire to hold.
Hence when prices were rising, investors with large unrealized capi-
tal gains would no longer be 'frozen' in their assets by their desire to
avoid capital gains taxes, and when prices were faffing, the decline
would not be accentuated by the desire of those with unrealized losses
to obtain a tax deduction by selling.
4) Full recognition would probably cause a substantial increase in
tax revenue. Some reduction might occur in the net yield from short
term gains and losses because the realized gains are taxed in full
under present law while the existing severe restriction on the allow-
ance for net short term losses would be removed. But short term
gains and losses constitute only a small proportion of the total. The
main sources of additional revenue would be the sharply increased
tax rates on realized long term gains, the taxability of these gains in
full instead of at half their amount, and the inclusion in taxableCOMPETING PROPOSALS 291
income of 'much appreciation that now escapes the income tax
through the transfer of the property at death. The tax rate on capital
gains, now limited to a maximum of 25 percent, would become equal
to the top surtax bracket rates plus the normal tax rate for the various
income groups under the ordinary income tax schedule, and would
rise as high as 82.1 percent.
Partly offsetting the larger revenue from net long term capital
gains would be the removal of the present limitations on the allow-
ances for realized net capital losses and the full recognition of unreal-
ized losses. In periods of declining values these allowances would
wipe out the tax liability on other income for many taxpayers. In
1932, for example, the aggregate market value of the securities listed
on the New York Stock Exchange alone declined about $30 billion.
Some persons would therefore contend that a limitation on the allow-
ance for capital losses is necessary for practical reasons. Others
would welcome such a wholesale automatic reduction of tax liabilities
in bad times, as well as the large increase in good times, as a valuable
counter-cyclical influence.
Other effects and difficulties
The annual accrual method would be likely to cause alterations in
the relative market values of different kinds of assets and shifts in the
portfolios of various investors. To the extent that individuals chose
their investments primarily because of the preferential tax treatment
of capital gains, they would have a motive to shift out of these hold-
ings. In addition, many investors who are content to own assets
yielding a small or no current income when they do not incur any
immediate tax liability for the price appreciation constituting a part
of the total expected return would be unwilling or unable to hold
such assets if the unrealized appreciation was taxed as current in-
come. In consequence, assets that promise to yield most of their
total return in the form of capital gains would tend to become rela-
tively less attractive, other things being equal, than assets yielding
most of their return in the form of current income. Corresponding
changes would tend to occur in their relative market values. To the
degree that unusually venturesome investments are of the former
type, the tax incentive offered them under the present treatment
would be removed. On the other hand, the introduction of unre-
stricted allowances for capital losses would stimulate this type of
investment.
Various practical difficulties of the annual accrual proposal may292 CHAPTER 11
be quickly noted. One is that annual changes in the market values
of capital assets do not correspond closely with changes in the actual
ability of their owners to obtain the cash required for income tax
payments. This difficulty is not serious in the case of ordinary prop-
erty taxes, as a rule, because they are levied at low rates, rarely
exceeding 2-4 percent of the total valuation, and because assessment
values and rates do not ordinarily fluctuate sharply. Nor is it seri-
ous for most listed securities if the taxpayer holds them in small
blocks, for he may sell a portion, if necessary, to raise the tax 'money.
Even in this instance, the selling induced by the tax may be sufficient
in the aggregate to depress prices severely. But many kinds of prop-
erty, such as improved real estate, are not easily divisible or readily
saleable, and some assets that appear to be saleable in small portions
must be retained in full by their owners for reasons of control, impair-
ment of value by partial sale, etc. While many owners of such proper-
ties would doubtless pay the tax out of their other income, others
in all except the lowest income groups, because of the high rates
applicable on both their unrealized capital gains and their other
income, would be compelled to borrow, retrench in personal expendi-
tures, or sell other assets. Peculiarly difficult problems would be
raised for trustees, life-tenants, and holders of other interests in
property held in trust.
Large numbers of taxpayers would deem the inclusion of unrea-
lized appreciation grossly unfair. Householders who did not intend
to sell their homes, and long term investors in common stocks who
had not consciously participated in a speculative boom, could be
expected to complain strenuously if told that they must include
increases in the paper values of their holdings in their taxable
incomes. Taxpayers who might otherwise take little notice of the
market value of their securities and other assets would be put on their
guard to heed such changes. The practical effects of speculative
changes in the market values of capital assets would be greatly
increased. A pronounced rise in the general level of prices would,
under this proposal, have much of the effect of a capital levy.
Since good markets with readily ascertainable prices do not exist
for all the lands, buildings, contracts, rights, and equities that consti-
tute capital assets, the annual appraisals of all such property would
present formidable difficulties in countless cases.2 The difficulties
would be both those of compliance on the part of the taxpayer and
2George0. May stated the valuation difficulties well in a letter published in
the New York Times, May 9, 1937.COMPETING PROPOSALS 293
of surveillance by the tax administrators. On small orders, market
quotations for many unlisted securities fluctuate widely; sales of
larger blocks, on the other hand, are often negotiated at prices mate-
rially higher or lower than market quotations. Several European
countries, to be sure, have braved these difficulties in connection
with annual personal taxes on net worth. The problems of valu-
ation might be manageable for an income tax if close precision
were not necessary to achieve rough justice. This would be the
situation, however, only if the rate structure of the income tax and
the ordinary income of the taxpayer remained relatively stable from
year to year. Considerable latitude could then be permitted in the
appraisal of assets whose market values were not readily ascertain-
able. Book values or rough approximations to market values could
be accepted because intentional or unintentional errors would be
subject to automatic and tolerably adjustment upon actual
realization of gain or loss or upon death. The progressive rate struc-
ture of the income tax would cause some disparity in the treatment
of gains and losses even for a taxpayer with stable ordinary income
and under an unchanging rate schedule. For example, under the
1949 rate schedule, a single person with ordinary net income of
$20,000 would have his tax increased $2,512 if a $5,000 rise in the
value of his capital assets was taxed as income, while a $5,000
decline would reduce his tax liability only $2,195. This discrepancy
would be substantial only when the capital gain or loss exceeded the
width of several surtax brackets.3
But with changing tax rates and fluctuating individual incomes,
both of which are more likely, the progressive rate schedule could
cause much larger discrepancies. A taxpayer's property might
increase $10,000 in value in a year when tax rates were raised and
his other income was large, but lose all this gain in one or more
following years when, because of a reduction in tax rates or in his
other income, the allowance for the decline in value would reduce
his taxes by an amount materially smaller than had previously been
added to them by the equal appreciation. Further, this defect of the
Under the Revenue Act of 1948 the surtax brackets are $2,000 wide for net
incomes of $2,000-22,000; the next $4,000 of income constitutes a single
bracket; the brackets are $6,000 wide thereafter up to $50,000 net income;
$10,000 wide for incomes of $50,000-100,000; and $50,000 wide for the next
$100,000, at which point, $200,000, graduation ceases. For married persons
filing joint returns, the surtax brackets are twice as wide, in effect, because
additional segments of income are divided between the spouses for the purpose
of determining the effective tax rates.294 CHAPTER 11
annual accrual method would be magnified by the tendency of capi-
tal losses to be larger in years of smaller than average ordinary
incomes, and of capital gains to occur more largely in years of higher
incomes. In addition, for many taxpayers the severe depreciation of
capital values in bad times would exceed their ordinary incomes and
would to this extent lose all tax-reducing value unless such unused
net losses could be carried back or forward for long periods, or the
accrual method was supplemented by an averaging device.
The failure of the annual accrual method to create a perfectly
symmetrical tax treatment of capital gains and losses would give
considerable importance to the allocation of estimated accruals of
unrealized gains and losses as between one year and another. Wide
latitude in annual appraisals, necessary for administrative reasons,
would therefore create opportunities for tax avoidance and material
for litigation. These difficulties would be reduced, however, if the
annual accrual method was combined with averaging income for
several years to determine each year's taxable income, or with a
generous carryback or canyforward of net capital losses against
ordinary income.
Constitutional difficulties of taxing unrealized appreciation
Whether the annual taxation of unrealized capital gains as income
would be held constitutional under the 16th Amendment is debata-
ble. In the Macomber case (1920), in which ordinary stock divi-
dends were held not to constitute taxable income, the Supreme Court
explicitly declared: "enrichment through increase in value of capital
investment is not income in any proper meaning of the term"; and
it strongly emphasized that a gain must be realized and "separated
from capital" to be taxable as income (252 U. S. at 214 and 207).
While some students think the Court might now reverse this deci-
sjOn,4 few appear to believe that it would do so by abandoning the
realization requirement, which is strongly rooted in American juris-
prudence.
Nevertheless, competent authorities have expressed contrary
views. Professor Isaacs contended that the Macomber case does not
foreclose inquiry into the possible constitutional basis of an annual
accrual plan of capital gains taxation.5 As noted in Chapter 2, Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for a minority of three justices in Helver-
'Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Tax
Law, 28 Minnesota Law Review, 163 (1944).
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ingv. Grilfiths (318 U. S. 371, 1943), declared that he did not see
any reason why Congress could not treat as income increases in the
wealth of stockholders due to the reinvestment of corporate earnings;
"the notion that there can be no 'income' to the shareholders in such
a case within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment unless the
gain is 'severed from' capital and made available to the recipient for
his 'separate use, benefit and disposal' will not stand analysis...."
Theescape of reinvested corporate profits from personal income
taxes levied upon shareholders unless the latter realize them in the
form of capital gains, as well as the preferential rate at which the
earnings are now taxed in the latter event, is perhaps the strongest
reason motivating those who urge the taxation of accrued as well
as of realized capital gains. Reinvested corporate profits, however,
constitute only one source of capital gains, and a special treatment
might conceivably be devised for them. It is possible to contend, as
well as to deny, that such earnings are truly current income to the
stockholders, whereas mere appreciation in land values, for example,
is not. The conspicuous role of reinvested corporate profits in the
thinking of those who propose changes in the current tax treatment
of capital gains and losses is reflected at several other points in this
chapter.
As a practical matter, it cannot be said that any strong and wide-
spread demand appears to exist for the annual taxation as income
of all unrealized appreciation in capital assets, and strong objections
would doubtless be made to full annual allowance for all unrealized
capital losses. In the light of this fact, of the constitutional doubts,
and of the practical difficulties of requiring and checking annual
valuations of capital assets, it seems unlikely that the annual accrual
proposal will receive serious consideration by Congress in the near
future.
4 CUMULATIVE AVERAGING OP INCOMES AND TAX LIABILITIES
A less familiar radical solution recently proposed for the full inclu-
sion in taxable income of realized gains and losses calls for the cumu-
lative averaging of taxable incomes and tax liabilities from year to
year. The taxable income of any year would be defined as the tax-
payer's average income over a period of years, including realized
gains and losses, and his tax liability would be adjusted annually,
for all previous over- or underpayments by reason of the reporting
in preceding years of taxable incomes differing from his average
income. Such an averaging device, first worked out by William296 CHAPTER 11
Vickrey,6 would leave the aggregate tax burden on an individual
unchanged by any shifts in the allocation of his income among the
various years included in the averaging period. The scheme is
designed to tax equitably all fluctuations in income as well as irregu-
lar capital gains and losses. It would not only eliminate the influence
of fluctuations in income upon the effective tax rates under a gradu-
ated rate schedule but also avoid penalizing taxpayers whose larger
incomes happened to be received in years when the entire rate
schedule was high, and unduly favoring those whose larger incomes
were received when the rate schedule was lower. By taking unrealized
capital gains and losses into account only at the end of the averag-
ing period, say every 10 years, or only upon the transfer of property
at death or by gift, the device would avoid the need for annual
appraisals of capital assets.
The procedure would be as follows: The taxpayer would report
an initial valuation of his capital assets, perhaps at cost or on a com-
promise transition basis, at the beginning of the year in which the
system went into effect or in which he entered the system. For the
first year the income and calculation of tax liability would be as at
present, except that realized capital gains and losses would be taken
into account in full (unrealized changes in value would be disre-
garded). At the end of the second year the taxpayer would add that
year's income to the first, and divide by 2 to arrive at his average
annual income. From tables prepared by the Treasury Department,
which would show the net effect on his average income of the tax
rates in force in the preceding as well as in the current year, he would
determine his total tax liability for the 2 years on the assumption
that the average income had been received in each, and remit to or
receive from the Treasury the difference between the aggregate tax
due for the 2 years and the amount paid the first year. His return
for the third year would contain the cumulated total of taxable
income and of taxes paid for the preceding 2 years. He would add
the income for the third year to the previous cumulated income,
divide by 3 to arrive at the average income, consult the tax tables
to determine the total tax liability for the 3 years, and subtract the
cumulated sum paid earlier to determine his current tax payment;
and so on until the end of the tenth year.
At that time, if this was the end of the averaging period, and if
unrealized changes in capital values were then to be accounted for,
°Jow-nal of Political Economy, June 1939, p. 379; and Agenda for Progressive
Taxation (Ronald Press, 1947), Ch. 6.COMPETING PROPOSALS 297
he would present a current valuation of his property, supported in
a manner prescribed by regulations. Any changes in the value since
the end of the preceding averaging period or since the dates of sub-
sequent purchases, other than those arising from gifts and inheri-
tances, realized capital gains and losses, and other sources previously
included in taxable income, would be added to or subtracted from
the income of the tenth year; after which that year's income would
be added to the cumulated total of the preceding nine years, then
divided by 10 to arrive at the average annual income for the 10
years. The aggregate tax liability for this income over the 10 years
would be determined by reference to the Treasury's tax tables. From
this sum would be deducted total taxes previously paid. The remain-
der would be the payment due in the tenth year. Conceivably the
averaging period could extend from the taxpayer's first income tax
return or his majority until his death.
Cumulative averaging would not require the reopening of preced-
ing years' tax returns, for only the number of years elapsed in the
averaging period, the cumulated total of taxable income, and the
sum of the taxes previously paid would be needed, and these figures
could be carried forward from the tax return of each preceding year.
A separate table of effective tax rates would be prepared by the
Treasury Department for each span of years covered by different
taxpayers during an averaging period: some individuals, more re-
cently become of age or for other reasons more recently entered into
the averaging system, might be submitting income tax returns for only
the third or fourth time while others were submitting them for the
seventh or eighth. If the averaging period was 10 years, the Treasury
would have to prepare 10 sets of tax tables, but each taxpayer would
have to refer to only one each year. Since cumulative averaging, other
things being equal, would reduce tax liabilities for those with fluctu-
ating incomes without raising them for those with stable incomes, a
somewhat higher level of tax rates would be needed to raise a given
revenue.
With unrealized gains and losses accounted for only every 10
years, or possibly only at death or at the time a gift is made, the valua-
tion problem would become more manageable. Taxpayers would be
kept abreast of their tax liabilities, except for the final reconciliation
for unrealized gains and losses at the end of the averaging period.
With such advance notice, it could be assumed that they will have
had ample opportunity to raise the sums required for taxes on unreal-
ized gains. At the same time, the knowledge that unrealized capital-— w—
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gains and losses must be accounted for on these occasions, though on
an average basis, might well reduce the influence of tax considera-
tions upon the timing of realizations of gain and loss. Voluntary
inclusion of appreciation in capital assets at any time during the
averaging period could also be permitted.
For stricter equity and to reduce the incentive offered by the free
use of tax funds to defer the realization of capital gains and other
income, it has been suggested that an interest adjustment might be
incorporated in the cumulative averaging of incomes. Taxpayers
would be credited each year with a stipulated rate of interest on the
cumulated taxes they had paid during the averaging period, and the
same amount of interest would be added to their cumulated incomes.
Those who deferred the realization of income would obtain smaller
interest credits. This adjustment, however, is not an essential part of
the device.
The cumulative averaging method would not avoid a heavy con-
centration of tax liability or tax credit in the year of realization. Tax-
payers would have their preceding years' taxable incomes raised by
current realizations of gains and lowered by current losses, and would
be required at these times to make up deficiencies in earlier tax pay-
ments or to receive credits for previous overpayments. In conse-
quence, an incentive would remain to defer the realization of gains
and to speed that of losses. If unrealized gains and losses were to be
accounted for at the end of each averaging period, the markets for
capital assets would probably be subjected to a large volume of tax-
motivated transactions as the end of the period approached. Such
transactions would be distributed over time if, instead of uniform
dates, the averaging periods of large groups of taxpayers were made
to end in different years.
If, on the other hand, unrealized changes in capital values were
to be recognized only at death or upon transfer of property by gift,
there would be a strong inducement to postpone realizing gains until
after the end of the averaging period. The fact that the action of one
Congress may be amended or repealed would lead many investors to
defer realization in the hope of favorable changes in the law. The
•treatment of unrealized changes in capital values as income at the
end of each averaging period or upon transfer of property by gift or
at death would raise the same questions of constitutional validity as
under the annual accrual proposal.
As with annual accrual of unrealized changes in capital values,
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receipts. While taxable incomes would be raised in depression years
by being averaged with larger preceding incomes, the average income
itself would be smaller and this would create tax credits for preceding
years that would tend to reduce the current year tax liabilities. Con-
versely, in prosperous periods the large incomes would be aver-
aged downward when combined with the lower incomes of preced—
ing years but the cumulated average would rise, thereby increasing
current tax liabilities for the underreporting of average income in the
preceding years. Nothing in the scheme would prevent raising tax
rates in good years and lowering them in bad years to accentuate this
effect. Those who favor a strong use of fiscal policy to reduce cyclical
fluctuations in private incomes would welcome such sizeable and
partly automatic responses in tax receipts to offset movements in
national income; others would doubtless be alarmed.
Although cumulative averaging seems to possess many attractive
possibilities, particularly in the direction of giving more equitable
tax treatment to individuals whose incomes, including capital gains
and losses, vary widely, the concept is novel and unfamiliar. It has
never been considered by Congress, nor has it yet received any sig-
nificant public attention. Its merits appear to justify serious study,
but it seems unlikely to command legislative attention in the near
future.
5 UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES EMBODIED IN PROPERTY
TRANSFERRED BY GIFT OR AT DEATH
Many persons who would oppose the inclusion of unrealized capita!
gains and losses in taxable income under the annual accrual propo-
sal, or at the end of relatively brief averaging periods, favor such a
treatment of gains and losses embodied in property transferred by
gift or at death. Under any method of taxing only realized capital
gains, including all devices hitherto tried in the United States, a broad
avenue for tax avoidance is created by the exclusion of unrealized
capital gains embodied in such transfers. Estate and gift taxes pro-
vide only a partial offsçt. They are payable also on estates that owe
nothing to unrealized appreciation in capital assets and on those that
have been reduced by income taxes previously paid on realized
gains. Although, other things being equal, the taxable estate is in-
creased, and often the marginal tax rate raised, when an estate con-
tains unrealized capital gains, the increase in the estate tax ordinarily
constitutes merely a small fraction of the income tax avoided on the
capital gains.300 CHAPTER 11
To begin with, no addition to a taxable estate takes place when a
man consumes during his lifetime the tax saved by not realizing his
gains. Even when he consumes none of it, the addition to his estate
tax cannot equal the saving in his income tax as long as the effective
rate of the former is less than 100 percent. For most estates the effec-
tive rate on additions is far below the present top bracket rate, 77
percent, on amounts in excess of $10,000,000 (for the tentative
estate tax, which is reduced by the allowable credit for inheritance
or estate taxes paid to states). In an estate of half a million dollars,
of which $400,000 represents unrealized appreciation, the total fed-
eral estate tax under the Revenue Act of 1948 would be $45,300 if
half the estate was left to the decedent's widow and half to his chil-
dren (after the maximum allowable credit for inheritance and estate
taxes paid to states). Had the decedent realized the capital gains in
the same amount before death and paid the maximum 25 percent
rate on them, he would have paid $100,000 more in income taxes
while reducing his estate tax only $13,800. The difference, $86,200,
represents the net taxes avoided by holding his appreciated assets
until death. The increase in the estate tax is a bigger offset in larger
estates, but in no case approaches closely the amount of capital gains
tax avoided.
Transfers of appreciated property by gifts inter vivos usually
involve a smaller ultimate tax avoidance and sometimes even a net
increase in taxes, because the donee, upon sale of the property,
becomes subject to a capital gains tax on the difference between the
proceeds and the donor's costs, and because a gift tax is payable
by the donor on the value of the gift itself. Nevertheless, transfers by
gift without recognition of accrued appreciation make possible
extremely long postponement of the capital gains tax, conceivably for
several generations; and the effective tax rates on gifts are generally
much lower than on estates. Moreover, the present transfer of 'basis'
from the donor to the donee is not consistent with the personal char-
acter of the income tax, for it permits appreciation accruing during
ownership by a donor with a large income to be taxed, if the prop-
erty is subsequently sold, at the lower rates applicable to donees with
smaller incomes.
Gifts of appreciated property for recognized charitable and scien-
tific purposes pose a special anomaly. By permitting the donor to
deduct the full current 'market value of the donated property from
his taxable income, up to 15 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
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in its value occurring during his ownership, the law, in effect, recog-
nizes the accrued appreciation as a deduction, but not as income. In
consequence, taxpayers in high surtax brackets may often make
charitable gifts in the form of appreciated assets at little net cost
to themselves. In extreme cases, the saving in the donor's taxes is
larger than the amount he could realize, net of taxes, by selling the
property.7
The estate and gift taxes do not provide any offset to the avoid-
ance of capital gains taxes (or the disallowance of unrealized capital
losses) whenever the amounts of property transferred are smaller
than the substantial exemptions and exclusions under the former.
Under the property-splitting provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948,
the amount that may be transferred tax-free was greatly increased.
For these various reasons, the estate and gift taxes provide relatively
small offsets in the aggregate to the capital gains taxes avoided
through transfers of appreciated assets at death and by gift.
A major consideration urged in favor of recognizing unrealized
capital gains and losses embodied in such transfers as components
of income is that this treatment logically complements the use at all
other times of the realization principle. To postpone recognition for
tax purposes of a capital gain or loss until it is realized by sale or
other transfer has many practical advantages over proposed treat-
ments that require annual tax accounting for changes in the market
value of capital assets, and is supported by long tradition and busi-
ness usage. Unless capital gains and losses are finally accounted for
at death, however, mere postponement of income tax liability or
credit may become transformed into complete avoidance or disallow-
ance. If transfers at death were made occasions for taxing accrued
gains, postponement of realization during life would still have the
advantage of a free use of funds otherwise currently payable in taxes,
but would lose the more powerful advantage of full income tax ex-
emption. Such a change would take most of the force from proposals
to tax accrued gains.
Under the 1948-49 rate schedule a single taxpayer with surtax net income of
more than $200,000 or a married couple with a joint income of more than
$400,000, after deduction of the maximum allowable charitable contribution,
would be money ahead if, instead of selling assets that had appreciated approxi-
mately 71.5 percent or more, they gave them to charity. The reduction in
income tax, 82.1275 percent of the value of the donated assets, plus the
avoidance of the 25 percent tax on the appreciation, would exceed the value
of the asset. If the taxpayer kept the asset, however, the capital gains tax would
not apply. Hence donating it would be more profitable than selling it but
not than keeping it.302 CHAPTER 11
This change has been urged also as perhaps the simplest and least
disrupting means of ensuring that stockholders will ultimately be
subjected to personal income tax on their pro rata shares of rein-
vested corporate profits. Such profits now escape the personal income
tax unless subsequently received in dividends or through realized
capital gains. Though offset in uneven degree for different stockhold-
ers by the corporate income tax, this type of tax avoidance is regarded
by many as the most serious inequity of the personal income tax.8
Apart from the question of equity, the fluidity of the market for
capital assets is affected. Even a moderate tax on realized capital
gains may be expected to discourage the sale of appreciated assets by
aged individuals if gains may pass tax-free at death. This influence is
enhanced by the fact that the equivalent of all or much of the gains
may nevertheless be enjoyed during life by borrowing against the
appreciated assets.
The valuation difficulties that would attend a general inclusion of
unrealized capital gains and losses in taxable income would be much
smaller if such treatment was confined to property passing at death
or transferred by gift. Valuations are already required for estates
large enough to be subject to federal or state estate and inheritance
taxes, and for gifts subject to the gift tax. Many more valuations
would be needed, however, to cover the assets of smaller estates and
gifts, and special difficulties would be faced in connection with prop-
erty held in trust.
The constitutional basis for taxing unrealized capital gains em-
bodied in property transferred at death or by gift may be stronger
than that for taxing other unrealized appreciation. It has been sug-
gested that such transfers of property can be legally regarded as
occasioning 'constructive realization' of capital gain or loss.9 Even if
this doctrine did not win judicial sanction, the same result might be
achieved by imposing an excise tax on the accrued gains at the same
rates and in combination with the taxes on ordinary income. Gift and
death have been held to constitute appropriate occasions for a federal
excise tax on property transfers. The constitutionality of applying
an excise tax at graduated rates to only the part of each gift or be-
8See,for example, Simons, Personal Income Taxation, pp. 164-5.
"See remarks of Eustace Seligman and S. S. Surrey in Capital Gains Taxation,
p. 41; H. M. Groves, Production, Jobs and Taxes (McGraw-Hill, 1944), p. 75,
and Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress (1946), p. 219; Committee for
Economic Development, A Postwar Federal Tax Plan for High Employment
(Aug. 1944), p. 31; Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, pp. 140-1 and
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quest that represents appreciation in the hands of the donor or de-
cedent would appear to turn on whether such a classification is
reasonable for the purpose of the tax.
Although the constructive realization proposal has been most com-
monly made in conjunction with programs for the full inclusion of
capital gains and losses in ordinary income, it could be applied also
to existing and similar preferential tax treatments of capital gains
and limitations on the deductibility of capital losses as a means of
reducing tax avoidance and postponement.
Transfer of basis
An alternative method of treating unrealized capital gains trans-
ferred at death appears to avoid the constitutional question involved
in the doctrine of constructive realization. Bequests of appreciated
property would be treated in the same way as gifts of such assets are
now treated: the recipient would be required, when he sold the prop-
erty, to calculate his taxable gain, if any, by the difference between
the proceeds and the cost of the property to the decedent, rather than,
as at present, by the difference between the proceeds and the value
of the property on the date of death.'° Such a method is open to the
objection that, by transferring the 'basis' of one individual to another
whose income may be in a much different tax bracket, it departs
from the principle of a personal income tax. But Congress has not
found this objection decisive in the case of gains embodied in gifts
inter vivos.
Whether a decedent should be permitted to transfer unrealized
capital losses raises a similar question. Much of the value of some
bequests would then arise from their power to reduce the tax liability
of the recipient, and testators could maximize the tax value of their
unrealized losses by bequeathing properties embodying the largest
losses to heirs with the largest taxable incomes. Congress shut off
these possibilities in the case of gifts inter vivos by requiring the
donee, upon sale of the property, to use market value on the date of
transfer, if this was less than the cost to the donor, as the basis for cal-
culating the capital loss. Congress would probably adopt a similar
rule to limit the loss allowance if inheritors of property were required
to adopt the basis of the decedent for calculating capital gains and
losses.
The objections raised against taxing as income unrealized capital
10Capital Gains Taxation, p.37, and Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxa-
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gains embodied in property transferred at death are identical in part
with those made against applying income taxes to any capital gains,
and, more particularly, against unrealized capital gains. The latter
are further removed from the traditional concept of income than
realized capital gains. No market transaction has been completed by
the decedent to mark the receipt of income represented by the unreal-
ized capital gain. Federal and state death taxes already 'make up for
some of the taxes that would be separately paid if a decedent's unreal-
ized gains were taxed, and the rest would have the practical result of
raising the effective rates of tax on estates. In many instances where
unrealized gains constituted a large fraction of a sizeable estate, the
difficulties already experienced by many executors in liquidating
property to raise cash to pay the death taxes would be seriously
increased.
6 AVERAGING DEVICES
The characteristically sporadic realization of capital gains and losses
has been a main reason for according them special treatment under
a graduated income tax. Otherwise they become subject to larger
taxes or to smaller allowances than if the same amounts were dis-
tributed among the taxable incomes of the years in which they were
emerging. The annual accrual proposal would avoid the bunching of
tax recognition in the year of realization, but would not meet the
problem of fluctuations in the annual accruals themselves. Apprecia-
tions in capital values would still tend to be bunched for most indi-
viduals in years of rising business activity, when the tax liabilities on
them would be increased by the inclusion of the gains with enlarged
ordinary incomes, the sum of which would be subject to the pro-
gressive rate schedule. For capital losses the tendencies would be
opposite. The treatment of death and gift transfers as occasioning
realization of gain or loss would, in the absence of countervailing
measures, accentuate the tax consequences of concentrated realiza-
tions. Cumulative averaging of all incomes would meet this problem,
as well as that of changing tax rates, but would be a radical departure
from practice.
The special treatments of capital gains and losses under American
income tax laws since 1921 have in no case closely approached those
of allocating capital gains and losses among the years in which they
arose. They have included, among other things, arbitrary narrow
limits on the deductibility of net capital losses from other income
and on the privilege of carrying forward unallowed net capital losses
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theassumption, often untrue, that the same taxpayers realize both
gains and losses, and partly on the practical view that taxpayers have
the initiative in realizing gains and losses, with the result that a more
liberal allowance for losses would be likely to motivate wealthy tax-
payers in particular to realize their losses but to leave their gains
unrealized.
In an attempt to reach a better solution, various devices for aver-
aging capital gains and losses have been proposed from time to time.
In recent years the averaging idea has been extended by some to
cover all highly fluctuating incomes and, as in the instance of cumu-
lative averaging, even all incomes.'1 The object is to avoid imposing
a higher tax upon individuals with variable incomes than upon those
with the same aggregate of stable incomes.
Most of the recent averaging proposals contemplate the full inclu-
sion of the averaged capital gains and losses in taxable income, but
would restrict it to the realized amounts, except that property trans-
fers at death or by gift would be regarded as occasioning construc-
tive realization. Averaging realized gains and losses is urged as more
manageable than the annual accrual proposal, though it too may be
combined with the periodic recognition of unrealized capital gains
and losses at longer intervals, say every 5 or 10 years. It may be com-
bined also with preferential tax rates on gains and limitation upon
the allowances for losses.
All averaging proposals that contemplate the full inclusion of capi-
tal gains and losses in taxable income entail sharp increases in the
present effective tax rates on gains and in the allowances for capital
losses. The equitable and practical effects of such increases, already
discussed, should be differentiated, as far as possible, from the rela-
tive merits of different averaging devices, for, among other reasons,
the latter may be combined with a varying degree of preferential
treatment of capital gains and of limitations on the allowances for
capital losses. Assuming a given degree of taxation, the relative mer-
its of different averaging schemes turn mainly upon how well they
offset the inequitable effects of a graduated rate schedule upon
bunched realization of gains and losses, on how, they affect the ability
and disposition of taxpayers to time transactions with an eye to tax
consequences, and their administrative complexity.
In addition to the cumulative averaging proposal discussed, three
Simons, op. cit.; Vickrey, Journal of Political Economy, June 1939, and
Agenda for Progressive Taxation, p. 166; Roy Blough, Averaging of Income
for TaxPurposes,Accounting Review, Jan.1945,p. 86.306 CHAPTER 11
other types of averaging devices may be distinguished: optional
periodic averaging of capital gains and losses, their proration over
a period of years, and carrybacks and carryforwards.
7 OPTIONAL PERIODIC AVERAGING OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
A relatively simple method of providing relief to taxpayers whose
annual incomes fluctuate materially was proposed by Henry C.
Simons and has been supported by others.'2 A taxpayer would have
the option of averaging his income for the preceding 5 years, and of
computing his aggregate tax liability as if his annual income, includ-
ing capital gains and losses, had been the average amount. He could
then apply for a refund of the difference between the total tax lia-
bility so computed and the taxes he actually paid. To avoid excessive
administrative costs when amounts are small, a moderate flat charge
of perhaps $20 plus 1 percent or less of the readjusted tax liability,
might be made.'3 If this device were applied only to capital gains and
losses rather than to all taxable income the administrative burden
would be much because fewer returns would be averaged.
Apart from the difficulties of reopening past returns, it has been
objected that taxpayers would have to engage in a guessing game as
to which of the various 5-year periods available to them should be
averaged to give them the biggest refund. Many persons would not
receive the relief open to them because of ignorance or faulty choice
of the averaging period. Vickrey points out that the plan does not do
anything to correct the unduly favorable treatment of taxpayers
whose years of high income happen to coincide with years of reduced
rates. Such discriminations might become more significant if rates
were changed frequently as part of a policy of counter-cyclical ma-
nipulation of tax revenues.
Nevertheless, the relative simplicity of the proposal, its effect of
permitting a wide offsetting of capital gains against earlier capital
losses and vice versa, and the distribution of a gain or loss over 5
years, are highly attractive.
8 PRORATION OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
Proration calls for evenly apportioning the amount of a capital gain
or loss among the years the asset was held, or over a fixed number
of years, such as 5. Five possible methods will be discussed in turn.
a) Backward proration over a fixed number of years
If a 5-year period were adopted, the taxpayer would divide the net
Op. cit., p. 154; H. M. Groves, op. cit., pp. 85-6.
has suggested this type of charge, Agenda for Progressive Taxation,
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capital gain or loss realized in the current year into 5 equal parts and
tentatively compute his tax for the current year, then recompute it
for each of the preceding 4 years, on the assumption that one-fifth of
his current year's capital gain or loss had been realized in each of
the 5 years. The tax on or tax credit for the capital gain or loss would
be the difference between the total tax liability for the 5 years and
the taxes already paid.
b) Backward proration over the number of years the asset was held
If the period, for prorating a realized capital gain or loss was the
actual number of years the asset had been held, the computations
would be much more complex. A gain or loss on an asset held 20
years would require reopening 19 annual tax returns; and a taxpayer
who realized gains and losses in the same year from several assets
held for varying periods would have to make a separate calculation,
involving a different number of previous tax rates, for each gain or
loss.
Under both proration devices just described, the necessity of re-
opening tax returns would create administrative difficulties. The
second would be far 'more cumbersome. Nevertheless, an analogous
device is now prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code, Section 107,
in connection with income from personal services and "artistic work
or invention" requiring 36 months or more to complete. Such in-
come, provided more than 80 percent is received in one taxable year,
may be prorated back over the period during which it was earned if
the taxpayer chooses. Back pay exceeding 15 percent of the tax-
payer's gross income in the year of receipt may also be allocated
back to the years in which it was earned. A similar apportionment of
realized capital gains over the period during which the asset was
held was embodied ma measure (H. R. 14198) passed by the House
of Representatives in 1920, but was rejected by the Senate because
of its administrative and compliance difficulties. Apportionment
backward over a fixed number of years, such as 5 or 10, would be
much simpler, but would also necessitate the reopening of past re-
turns. Individuals realizing capital gains or losses each year, of
course, vastly outnumber the relatively few who are affected by
Section 107.
c) Backward proration with tax or credit determined by current
income and rates
One proration method that avoids reopening returns would have the
taxpayer (1) divide his realized net capital gain or loss (presumably
on assets held more than 1 year) into a fixed number of equal parts,308 CHAPTER 11
say 5; (2) compute the difference in his tax liability before and after
adding one-fifth of the capital gain or loss to his other income in the
year of realization; and (3) multiply this difference by 5 to arrive
at the full amount of the tax or tax credit for the total capital gain or
loss. The effective tax rate or tax credit would be determined by the
taxpayer's ordinary income and the prevailing rate schedule in the
year of realization rather than by the ordinary income and rate
schedules during the years the gain or loss actually or presumptively
accrued. The results would be identical only if the taxpayer's ordi-
nary net income and the effective tax rate remained constant during
the period. The equity sacrificed by assuming constancy of ordinary
income and effective tax rate must be weighed against the tremen-
dous reduction in the difficulties of compliance and administration.
Under all three methods of backward proration the tax would be
payable or the loss deductible in the year of realization. This has the
advantage of synchronizing the tax liability on a gain with the pre-
sumable receipt of funds with which to pay it, and of synchro-
nizing the loss allowance with a realized loss. It has the disadvantage
of retaining or increasing much of the present influence of tax con-
siderations upon the timing of sales of capital assets. Under the third
method, taxpayers would have a motive for bunching realizations
of gains in years of low tax rates and small ordinary income and for
bunching loss realizations in years of high rates and large ordinary
income. If the prescribed averaging period was the number of years
the asset had been held, a strong motive would be offered to realize
losses quickly but to defer the realization of gains as long as possible.
Were a uniform averaging period adopted (presumably for all
gains and losses on assets held more than 1 year), and were the
effective tax rates those of the preceding 5 or 10 years, the effect
upon the timing of transactions would be somewhat more diffuse,
but would still be responsive to calculations of the relative tax lia-
bilities under the income and tax rates of the preceding 5 or 10 years
as against those in prospect. Under all three methods, moreover, tax-
payers would retain an incentive to defer the realization of capital
gains in order to avoid the immediate loss of capital funds to meet
the tax liability; and they would be encouraged to take losses quickly
to obtain immediate tax reductions.
d) Forward proration over a fixed number of years
A fourth method, which would reduce these influences, is to prorate
capital gains and losses over the succeeding instead of the preceding
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income only one-fifth of a net realized gain or loss, for example, and
wouldcarry forward one-fifth to each of the next 4 years. His tax or
tax deduction would be determined by his ordinary income and the
prevailing tax schedules in the current and succeeding 4 years, instead
of those of the years in which the gain or loss actually or presump-
tively accrued.
The smaller immediate tax liability could be expected to weaken
the deterrent effect of the tax upon decisions to realize gains. An
investor contemplating the sale of appreciated property would face
an immediate reduction in his liquid funds or earning assets of only
one-fifth of the tax liability on his gains, if a 5-year period was
adopted, and the remainder would be distributed over the ensuing
4 years. Similarly, if only one-fifth of a loss was deductible in the year
of realization, the tax incentive to take losses at particular times
would be less pronounced. The effective tax rates and allowances on
the gains and losses carried forward would be unknown because they
would depend upon the future tax schedules and the taxpayer's future
income.
e) Forward proration with tax or credit determined by current in-
come and rates
Instead of the amounts of untaxed gains and unallowed losses, the
carryforwards might be in the form of a fixed tax liability or tax
credit, determined by the taxable income and rate schedule of the
year of realization, and payable or deductible in equal annual instal-
ments, such as one-fifth. This scheme would differ from the preced-
ing in that the taxpayer would know the total tax cost or tax allow-
ance of his gain or loss and in that only one year's tax return would
have to be looked at to determine the amount.
Forward proration of profits from instalment sales, including capi-
tal gains, is now permitted under the Internal Revenue Code, Section
44, the taxes due each year being only in proportion to the payments
received. The practical advantage of synchronizing the tax liability
with the receipt of income, which is achieved in the instalment sales
provision, would be absent under universal forward proration of
capital gains and losses. Some loss of revenue could doubtless be
expected owing to the inability of some taxpayers to pay the deferred
taxes on gains previously realized.
Deferred tax charges and credits easier to administer but less equita-
ble than direct offsetting of gains and losses
Whether or not full deductibility of capital losses from ordinary in-
is allowed, averaging methods that permit the forward or back-310 CHAPTER 11
ward offsetting of capital gains and losses against each other are
likely to be 'more advantageous to taxpayers than those that merely
fix the tax rate or tax credit by prorating gains and losses, for a
graduated rate schedule causes the tax-reducing value of capital
losses to be less than the taxes on equal amounts of capital gains,
assuming that other income is constant. The practical importance of
the difference is increased by the tendency for larger amounts of
capital gains to be realized in higher income periods, and of capital
losses to be heavier when ordinary incomes are lower. The difference
would be further increased if the federal government adopted a policy
of raising and reducing tax rates with upward and downward move-
ments, respectively, in national income.
However, the administrative consideration that the determination
of the tax or tax credit by referring to a single year's return is much
simpler favors the third and fifth proration methods.
Any variant of the proration technique could be introduced on
either a voluntary or compulsory basis. Since the primary objective
would be to redress unfairness suffered only by some taxpayers, and
since it is desirable to keep the administrative burden as small as
possible, a voluntary basis would seem adequate.
9 DESIRABLE LENGTH OF THE AVERAGING PERIOD
If capital gains alone are considered, the averaging period necessary
to overcome tolerably well the inequitable consequences of applying
graduated rates to bunched realizations is much shorter, in all but
exceptional cases, than might be imagined. In effect, averaging mul-
tiplies each surtax bracket by the number of years in the averaging
period. For example, if the averaging period was 5 years, the whole
of a $10,000 capital gain would be taxed at the rate applicable to an
addition of only $2,000 a year to the surtax income. The existing
surtax brackets are narrowest and the graduation of rates sharpest
in the lower part of the surtax schedule; the brackets become fairly
wide and the progression of rates small in the upper part. For mar-
ried persons filing joint returns under the Revenue Act of 1950, the
effective surtax brackets were $4,000 wide at the lower end of the sur-
taxscaleand $100,000 at the top. With a 5-year averaging period,
these surtax brackets would in effect range from $20,000 at the lower
end of the scale to $500,000 at the top. For single persons and mar-
ried persons filing separate returns, the brackets would be half as
wide.
These figures suggest that an averaging period as short as 5 or—
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even 3 years would be sufficient in most instances to eliminate any
sizeable tax penalties otherwise created by a concentration of capital
gains in a single year. If the sole object of the present preferential tax
rates on capital gains is to offset the over-taxation of bunched gains
under a graduated rate schedule, the offset is excessive. The present
rates are materially lower than those that would prevail even under
an averaging period as long as 20 years.
Only a relatively small difference in effective rates would be ob-
tained under a 20-year, as compared with a 5-year averaging period,
if we assume that ordinary income is constant. For example, for a
married couple without dependents filing a joint return reporting a
net income of $50,000, the difference in the effective tax rate on a
capital gain of $50,000 fully prorated over 20 instead of 5 years
would be less than 2 percentage points. It would shrink for smaller
capital gains and for larger incomes.
The differences are somewhat more substantial, but not large, for
incomes of $25,000 or less. On a joint return reporting ordinary
income of $5,000, the difference in effective tax rate between a 5-
and a 20-year averaging period, with• capital gains fully included,
would be 1.6 percentage points for a $5,000 capital gain, less than
one point for a $10,000 or $25,000 capital gain, and 2.9 points for
a $50,000 capital gain.
A similar comparison with respect to capital losses is presented in
Table 89. Since this table shows only the tax value of the deducti-
bility of capital losses from ordinary income, which is limited to
$6,000 over a 5-year period under present law, it understates the
existing loss allowance to the extent that taxpayers offset their capital
losses against capital gains. The tax value of allowances for losses
under any system of averaging would depend also in large degree
upon the extent to which the taxpayer were permitted and able to
utilize his capital losses to offset capital gains. The table clearly
shows the small existing allowance against ordinary income for
capital losses, and the large increases that would follow from full
allowance under averaging. For example, a 'married couple filing a
joint return with a constant ordinary net income of $10,000 and
reporting a $10,000 net capital loss now receives a reduction in tax
amounting to 11.1 percent of the capital loss over the 5-year carry-
over period. If the loss was allowed in full and prorated evenly over
5 years, the tax reduction for the loss would be almost double, 20.8
percent.
The equitable treatment of capital losses that are large relative to__--_ —
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ordinary income would appear to require either a longer averaging
period than that for capital gains or a carryover of unused capital
losses from one averaging period to the next. Otherwise a taxpayer's
income during the period may be insufficient to permit him to offset
his losses for tax purposes. Under a 5-year averaging period a mar-
ried couple filing a joint return showing a constant ordinary income
of $5,000, and realizing a net capital loss of $50,000 in one year,
would obtain a total tax reduction equal to only 6.3 percent of the
loss, as compared with 12.6 and 16.6 percent, respectively, for 10-
and 20-year averaging periods.
10 CARRYING CAPITAL LOSSES BACK AND FORWARD SOLELY AGAINST
CAPITAL GAINS
A considerable measure of averaging capital gains and losses could
be achieved merely by permitting taxpayers to offset capital gains
realized in any year by unallowed capital losses reported during the
preceding few years, and by permitting capital losses realized in any
year not only to be carried forward against future capital gains but
to offset capital gains reported in several preceding years. For exam-
ple, offsetting could be permitted for 3 years back, and unused losses
carried forward 3 years.
The present 5-year carryforward of capital losses against future
capital gains is defective in that it benefits only those who realize
future capital gains. Losers not lucky enough to obtain offsetting
gains receive relief only to the extent that their net capital losses are
covered by the existing allowance of $1,000 against ordinary income
in each of 6 successive years. If they were permitted to offset losses
also against earlier capital gains and to receive an appropriate tax
refund or credit, the treatment would be more balanced. The dis-
crimination now suffered by persons whose capital gains precede
their capital losses, as against those whose losses come first, would
be eliminated.
This method could be combined with any of the proration devices
and with restrictions on the deductibility of capital losses from ordi-
nary income and on the proportion of capital gains subject to income
tax.
This type of averaging would obviously be more limited in its
effects than the more comprehensive methods previously discussed.
It would, however, achieve one of the major objectives: a more equi-
table treatment of taxpayers who realize both capital gains and losses
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of capital losses from ordinary income would support a proposal of
this character.
11 CONTROLLING INFLUENCE OF MARKET EFFECTS UPON EVOLU-
TION OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX TREATMENT IN THE U. S.
The more radical proposed departures from present practice re-
viewed in the foregoing all place a much greater emphasis upon
equitable as opposed to operational considerations than Congress
has been disposed to do. Moreover, the desire to avoid undue admin-
istrative complexity has been a serious obstacle to their adoption.
Other barriers have been the desire to maximize tax revenues and to
offer a special tax incentive for venturesome investment. Most impor-
tant of all has been the fear of unduly impeding transactions in capital
assets. In recommending in 1921 the abandonment of the full inclu-
sion of realized capital gains and losses in taxable income, the Ways
and Means Committee declared:
"The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is
now seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over
a series of years are under the present law taxed as a lump sum (and
the amount of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the year in which
the profit is realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit tak-
ing and consequent increase of the tax revenue, have been blocked
by this feature of the present law."
Again in 1923, in commenting on the pre-1922 full recognition,
the Committee declared:
"But of much greater importance was the decided interference
with the normal course of business and commerce. With a maximum
tax of 77 percent there was a severe artificial restraint on sales at a
profit, and many transfers of property extremely desirable from the
standpoint of economic development and general public welfare
were not only retarded but actually prevented. In addition, there was
a serious loss of revenue, in that the initiative, as is always the case,
remained with the taxpayer, who refrained from taking a profit but
who did not hesitate to take a loss which could be deducted in full
from his taxable income." This consideration has remained a domi-
nant influence in most subsequent revisions of the tax treatment of
capital gains.
Had Congress been concerned solely with the effects upon the
markets for capital assets, it could have disposed of the problem
merely by excluding capital gains from taxable income or by impos-
ing a flat rate. The latter proposal has been strongly urged at various314 CHAPTER 11
times, and was incorporated in the Boland Billof1942 (H. R. 6358).
But equitable considerations, in the sense of the equal tax treatment
of similarly circumstanced taxpayers, led most legislators to insist
upon some degree of integration between taxes on capital gains and
on ordinary income. Three aspects of equity have been prominent in
this connection: the relative treatment of (a) equal incomes derived
from ordinary sources and from capital gains; (b) different amounts
of capital gains realized by taxpayers with equal ordinary incomes;
and (c) stable ordinary incomes and the characteristically bunched
realizations of capital gains emerging over a period of more than
one year.
The Revenue Act of 1921 attempted to reconcile these aspects of
equity with the demands of practical expediency by the full inclusion
of capital gains and losses in taxable income for all individuals whose
effective tax rate on capital gains would be 12½ percent or less; and
by the separate taxation of the gains realized by others at a flat rate
of 12½ percent. Subsequently a parallel treatment for the allowance
of capital losses was adopted. These provisions withheld preferential
rates from the gains of taxpayers with smaller incomes.
In the early and middle 1930's problems of tax avoidance and of
achieving more equity and progressivity in the income tax structure
assumed a larger place in public discussions than the maintenance of
active securities markets. The desirable degree of preference in tax
rates to be accorded capital gains was now thought to turn more
largely on their lumpy character and the consequent inequity of tax-
ing them in full under a system of graduated rates. Accordingly, in
the Revenue Act of 1934 Congress removed the ceiling on the effec-
tive tax rates applicable to capital gains, graduated the degree of
preferential treatment in 5 stages according to the length of time the
asset had been held by excluding progressively larger fractions of
the gains from taxable income, and extended this treatment to all
taxable incomes.
Many persons mistakenly believed that the percentage exclusion
treatment adopted would yield substantially the same results, with
less administrative complexity, as the proration of capital gains and
losses over the same periods. But the degree of tax preference needed
solely to offset the higher tax rates otherwise applicable to the
bunched realization of long-emerging capital gains is smaller than
is commonly believed, as previously noted, and varies with income.
Since the tax brackets widen considerably and the progression of
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as are large relative to ordinary income in the lower and middle sur-
tax brackets tend to raise materially the effective rates under the
rate schedule then or now in force. Consequently, different rather
than uniform percentages of exclusion for different income levels
would be needed to achieve results approximating those of proration.
As noted in Chapter 6, the graduated fractional recognition
method of 193 4-37, which did not stipulate any special maximum
rate for capital gains, noticeably discouraged the realization of gains
by the upper income groups both because of the sharply increased
tax rates and because of the substantial tax reductions offered for
continued holding of an appreciated asset beyond the end of each
successive holding period. The percentage allowances for capital
losses of different age groups created anomalies by stimulating tax-
payers to choose the assets on which to realize losses in such ways
as to offset relatively large gains from long-held assets with smaller
losses from shorter-held ones. On the other hand, the rigid limitation
of $2,000 on the deductibility of statutory net capital losses from
ordinary income aroused widespread complaint.
When the Revenue Act of 1938 was in the early stages of its legis-
lative history the House Bill sought to reduce the sharp stepdowns
in effective rates for capital gains and losses as the period of owner-
ship lengthened. Instead of only 5ageclasses it was proposed to
substitute 49, with a gently graduated downward movement of effec-
tive rates as ownership lengthened. But this provision, which was
subsequently eliminated because of its administratiye complexity,
would have been of doubtful efficacy in reducing the tax incentive to
postpone realizations of gains. Under the 1934 Act an investor who
had held an appreciating asset for 2 years could not ordinarily obtain
a further tax advantage from continued retention unless he was pre-
pared to hold it for at least 3 years more; but under the 1938 House
Bill, every additional few months of holding beyond 2 years would
confer a tax advantage.
With its eyes fixed once more on the capital 'markets, Congress
finally reduced to only 2 the holding periods entitled to preferential
treatment: 18-24, and over 24 months; and it reimposed ceiling
rates on capital gains: 15 percent on gains from assets held longer
than 2 years, and 20 percent on gains from assets held 18-24 months.
At the same time it removed the $2,000 limit on the deductibility of
statutory net capital losses from other income, except that net losses
on assets held 18 months or less could be carried forward and de-
ducted only from short term gains realized in the succeeding year.316 CHAPTER 11
The drastic increases in effective tax rates on Ordinary incomes in
1939-41, preceding the entrance of the United States into World
War II, were not accompanied by a rise in the maximum rates on
capital gains. When further advances in ordinary rates were in proc-
ess of enactment in 1942, the disparity seemed excessive on both
equitable and practical counts, and Congress raised the ceiling rate
on capital gains to 25 percent. As contrasted with the new high rates
on ordinary incomes, this rate was believed to offer sufficient tax
preference to avoid severely impeding transactions in capital assets.
At the same time Congress returned to a single holding period for
qualifying capital gains for preferential treatment. It merely excluded
from taxable income half of the gains from all assets held more than
6 months. The maximum rate, 25 percent of the total gain, applied
only when the inclusion of half the gain in ordinary income would
impose a higher effective rate. Impressed by the large loss realizations
of 1938-41 under the unlimited deductibility of statutory net long
term capital losses then in effect, Congress reimposed restrictions on
such allowances though in a new manner as discussed in Chapter 7.
Exclusion of short term gains and losses from special treatment
The evolution of American practice with respect to the exclusion of
short term gains and losses from special treatment reflects a similar
emphasis upon market effects, qualified by equitable considerations
and by a desire to withhold preferential treatment from speculative
gains. The initial 2-year holding period requirement became a part
of the Revenue Act of 1921 through an amendment offered on the
floor of the Senate. The bill under consideration proposed to extend
preferential treatment to all capital gains, but Senator Walsh of
Massachusetts objected to the absence of a distinction between "in-
creased value... extendingover a long period of years and that
sudden and speculative increase that develops within a short period
of time". He proposed a 3-year holding period, but compromised on
2-years when a 1-year requirement was suggested to overcome his
objection.14
The persistence of this attitude toward short term speculative gains
is indicated in the report of a subcommittee of the House Ways and
Means Committee in 1938:
"It has always been the settled policy of the Congress to tax specu-
lative gains in general in the same manner and to the same extent as
earned income and business profits. ... Yoursubcommittee believes
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that this policy is wise and should be adhered to. it would be against
sound public policy to make any changes in the revenue law whose
tendency would be affirmatively to encourage speculation by prefer-
ential taxation.. .. Yoursubcommittee recognizes that a classification
based solely upon the period of holding is not an exact method for
segregating speculative from investment transactions, but it appears
to be the only practicable method and is believed to be a sufficiently
fair criterion for practical purposes."
But the unwillingness to grant tax privileges to speculative gains
conificted with the desire to avoid impeding the ready transfer of
capital assets. Even under the relatively low income tax rates in
force in the latter part 011922-31, the 2-year holding period was
criticized on the ground that it retarded the realization of gains and
speeded that of losses. The step-down scale of 1934-37 reduced the
minimum required period to 1 year. The Revenue Act of 1938
raised it to 18 months.
During the Congressional hearings on the Revenue Act of 1942
strong representations were made that the 18-month requirement
was seriously interfering with the free transfer of capital funds, and
the Boland Bill, as already noted, proposed to abolish the holding
period. A 1-year period was suggested by others as most consistent
with the annual taxation of ordinary income. The 6-month period
finally adopted was the most liberal since the holding period concept
was first introduced.
The existing tax treatment of capital gains and losses is clearly the
product of long legislative experimentation. It would be foolhardy to
predict that it will not be modified further, perhaps radically. Never-
theless, barring major alterations in the general income tax struc-
ture, it is reasonable to expect that the same group of competing
considerations that governed Congress in evolving the present treat-
ment will continue to be coercive, though they will doubtless vary
in relative strength from time to time. Consequently, changes that
retain the essential form of the present treatment are more likely
to receive near-term serious consideration than others.
From a longer range standpoint it is well to emphasize that the
whole concept of taxable income is relatively new and still evolving.
The acceptance of the incothe tax as a personal impost, the greater
reliance of governments upon it as a major source of revenue, and
the tremendous growth in the importance of large scale corporate318 CHAPTER 11
enterprise have refined and made more complex the concept of
taxable income. The prominence of capital gains as a source of pri-
vate wealth in the United States, and the origin of considerable
amounts of them, though far from all, in reinvested corporate profits,
early led this country to treat them as ordinary constituents of in-
come. Their peculiar characteristics under an annual income tax
thereupon raised problems that have so far defied satisfactory solu-
tion. On the one hand, capital gains add to the economic power of
individuals no less than ordinary kinds of income. On the other hand,
to treat capital gains as such under a graduated income tax raises
questions of equity and of adverse operational effects upon transac-
tions in capital assets. In these connections, numerous conflicting
contentions have been made. In presenting various aspects of the
problem our object is to give the reader analyses and empirical
materials on which he can base his own judgments, not to make
recommendations.